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Sununary
This paper analyzes the Eurodollar rnarket, investigating the reasonsfor its expansion and the consequences for inonetary policy. In the firstpart of the paper, the issue of credit and noney creatlon by offshore
banks is considered. The nature of the tiquidity creation process is
shown to be dependent on the specific definitions of noney and balaaceof payments posltion that are adopted by the nationaf authorities. The
concepts of money (in donestic and foreign currencies)hefd by residents
and of basic balance are specified, and it is denonstrated that thedohestic economy of a given country is not dj.rectfy affected by the
externaf use of its currency between non-resiclents. The development ofthese externaf, transactions, however, proves to be directly dependent onthe donestic policies folloired by the nonetary authorj.ties of that
The second part of the paper is devoted to an enpirical anafysis ofthe development of the Euroctotfar narket cturing the period from 1974 to1980. EstiiEtes of a partial adjustnent rnodef show that credit expansionin the Euroclollar narket during this perioat was targely ndernanddetermined, n owing to the nonetary poltcy irnpfernentea ;y the EederalReserve. The econonetrtc results stress the key role of internationaftrade in the clevefopnent of the Euroclottar activities during these years.Ihplications of these resurts for the regufation or turomaitets arebriefty constdered jn the conctusio
* l.!r. Michel ca.Iy is deputy clirector at ea"q;;;;-E;.;;;l;;;
of this paper was conpletecl during a period vrhile he was in the ResearchDepartnent of the Internationat Monetary Fund on secondnent from Banque deFrance. David I. Eolkerts-landau, Malco.Im (night and Denis Richard from theResearch Departnrent provided extensive cornnents on this eartier draft. The
author retains all .esponsibitity for the renaining errors. The views
expressed in this paper do not ref]eet necessariLy the position of theErench monetary authorities,
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I.
Anong the rnost controversial quesllons concerning Eurocurrencv
bankina activities, 1/ two issues are of particular concern for 
'entralbankers: first, the possibility that these activities are able to create
liquid assets and bank credit outside the reach of nonetary authorities;
and second, the question of vhat are the fundaDental factors accounting
for the draroatic expansion of these operations since 1973. This Paper
attenpts to provide theoretical and eopirical ansoers [o these questions'
using a nultinational portfolio approach that enphasizes the balance sheet
constralnts of the bank and nonbank sectors both at hone and abroad'
Foltoting a discussion of the effect of EurodolLar exPansion on the
ooney supply process and related external pa)nents imbalances in a sche-
natic accounting framework ln Section Il, the Dechanics of credit and
broad-money creation by Eurobanks is considered. In Sections III and IV
an enpirical analysis of the behavior of banks and nonbanks from 1974 to
1979 is conducted to test the hypotheses develoPed in Section II for both
the broad and narroU definitions of noney supply. It is also ar8ued,
following Helrer (1979), that during this period Eurobanks ner:e Able to
supply Eurodollar loans 3t an interest rate that vas essentially deter-
ntned exogenously in the U.S. donesEic financial Darket. In this sense,
the flolr of Eurocredit was largely " denand-de termined . " Building on this
characteristic, Section V presenLs a partial-adjustnent nodel of the Euro-
dollar market, stressing the impoitance of world trade as a najor factor
in its erpansion, vhile Section VI provides emplrical estirates of this
Eodel. Fina11y, sevetal proPosals for the regulation of Euronarkets are
presented in the conclusion.
II. The Effects of Eurodollar Actlvlties on the Money Stock
and the Balance of PavDeDts: A Franeuork for Analysis
the existing literature on the effects of Eurodollar activ-
U.S. balance of palnents and money stock treats the two sub-
they were unrelated. In this sectioD, a Eultinational view is
the need for consistent definitlons for these two ststistlcal
Much of
jects as if
adopted and
Table l presents a financial asset-sector natrix for bank and nonbank
agents in a nultinational franeltork. The table ls desiAned to hiShlight
the Eurodollar activities of these agents and the ,ay they impinge on
varlous definitions of noney suPPly and on external palments positions'
The matrix distinatlishes betveen the united States (US) and the rest of
a presentation of the various
activities, see
concernlng the
( 1976 ), Johnston (1981).
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the world (Row). There 3re only two financial insrruoenrs: noney, denoted(M), and bank crediE, denored (L). An asterisk denotes U.S. financial
narkets. Iloney is defined as cash, deDand deposirs and orher short-tero
deposits. Credits, l,hich are supplied by banks for shorr and long rerm
naturities, are insLrunents rhat cannot b€ sold on a secondary Darker.This simplified framevork neglects the narket for corporare bonds.
The first subscript associated wirh each variable defines rhe cur-
rency in which (M) and (L) are expressed: (d) for the u.S. do11ar and (f)
for RoW currencies. On the assumpEion rhat a fixed exchange rate systeDis in force, the exogenous oxchange rate between (f) and (d) is held con-
stant and equal to unity. 1/ The second subscript defines rhe sector rhar
holds the asset. There are four secrors: rhe U.S. and ROll dooestic banking
sectors (including the central bank) subscripred l and 3 respecrively, andthe U.S, and ROIJ non-bank sectors (including governDents) subscripred 2
and 4 respectively, For insEance, according to rhese convenrions, Ld2 and
L;4 reptesent respectivety Ehe loans in d currency Sranted by the ROWbankinS sector to Ehe U,S. nonbank secror and Ehe loans in d currency
Sranted by the U.S. barking sector ro the ROW non-bank secror. Both the
U.S. and RoW nonbank sectors hold deposirs and borror^, via loans in U.S.dollars and in Rol,{ currencies, eirher ar home or abroad. The U.S. and ROW
banking sectors atso hold financial liabllities and ctains against each
other in the d and f currencies.
In the sinplified asset-secror maErix of Table 1, rhe rows are ba1-
ance sheet identities of the four respective sectors and columns representDarket clearing conditions for each rype of asset. Insrrunents that are
liabillties of a sector are preceded by a ninus sign. Srarring from rhis
fraDework, let us define rhe external activirles of banks resident in the
U.S. and RoI,/ 2/ and the way they affect rhe money srocks and Ehe balance
ot pa)'ments positions of borh countries.
As has already been noted, financial assers and liabilities are orga-
nlzed in Table l according ro three criteria: rhe locarlon of the asser(Ro and Us), the currency (f or d), and rhe secror (banks or non-banks)
which holds it. This system pernits us ro isolare the Eurodollar acrlv-
itles of Row banks in teros of their assets and 1labl1iries denoninated
in currency d and held by the RO and U.S. nonbank secrors; that isj rhedepostt and credit narkets depicted in colu.rns (5) and (7) of Table t,
together sith their clearinfmarket prices rd and r. By the saDe coken,
colulons (2) and (4) define the exrernal deposit and credit markeEs of the
Rol,l currency.
1/ It 1s also this assuoption which peroits us to aSgre8are all foreign
currencies into a single currency,
U It ls vorth notinS rhat a U.S. bank branch or subsidiary locared inthe RoW econoDy is here defined as a ROtl residenr bank.
t_
The relative sizes and rates of expansion of these external Darkets
depend larSely on the degree of international caPital narket integration;
rat is, oi tire degree t; {hich donestic regulations 1/ inposed bv cen-
tral banks on the process of credit and tnonev creaEion, elther to'ard
residents or non-residents, affect the size and groEth rates of variods
narkets. In this respect tt is rseful to considei the tvo foilolrina
extreme cases:
(1) Assuoe that markets are perfectlv integrated, so that external
anal doEestic assels are perfect substiEutes' In a world of certainty ldith
a fixed exchange rate systen, arbitrage will alsavs oalntain lhe equali-
tles rusd = rd, rra = red, rus = r, rf = re. tn this case, the relative
size of external financial narkeEs PiIl be lndependent of interest rate
variations and will be detemined by other factors, such 3s the real and
cyclical movenents affecting, resPectively, ihe doDestic activities and
international transactions U thaL are usually flnanced via these external
(tl) Alternattvely' assume either that there is uncertaintv or
that Ehe authorities impose restrictions on portfolio behavlor' In thls
case the relative size of the external asset market for a 81ven currency
w111 obviously depend on the origin and nature of regulations, on the
respective risk and return of conPetlng assets either in US or ROW cur-
."".y, us ue11 as on the factors previouslv cited in (i)' If the Row
country impleDents controls on lnternational caPital transactions
lnvolving instrunents denonlnated in donestlc currency' Ehe relative size
of Eurod;1]ar nrarkets ui1l be larger than in situation (1) vhere narkets
are perfectly lntegrated, and the use of the do11ar as an international
currency trill be enhanced. Conversely, if US exchange controls or regula-
tions liDlt the access of non-resident banks to the U'S' douestic market,
the relaElve size of Eurodoltar rarkets will be smaller than in situa-
tion (i). Thus, for given 1eve1s of real lncome and prices the relative
size of Eurodoliar narkets ldi11 be larger the less regulated are U'S'
capital markets relatlve to those of the ROI'I. Hovever, for a Siven set
of exchange controls sncl regulations, Eh€ expansion of Eurodollar markets
\r111 depend r[ainly on the development of international transactions'
risks, and rates of return on oEher asseEs.
Ire nou turn to the consequences of an expansion ln Eurocurrency
aleposlts on the donestic ooney supply. If ve assume that the actions of
reserve raEios on non-resldent deposits than on rPsidenL
.leposits. O; these polnts see' for lnstance, Heuson and Sakakibara (1975)
Crockett ( r976), Resler (1979).
2/ On the role of international trade 1n the Srovth of Euroculrencv
maitets, see Svoboda ( 1968).
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each central bank are ieslricted to the resident banking sector in its
olrn country, ve nay conslder five possible definitions of the roney stock
held by nonbank sectors. Eor the ROl"/, these l{ould be (froD Table 1):
Ml - domesL-ic money heid by res.ioen(s only (llt4),
u2 = donestic money held by both residents and non-residents(xe +He ),
'a -2
u3 = ronetary assecs denoninated in both doDestic and foreign curren-
cies held by residenLs on-ty (Mr + l'ld ).44
M4 = domestic and foreign nonetary assets held by both residents and
non-residents ( flf I Md , l'1r + Md ),
'L -L 2 -2
M5 = domesEic and foreign oonies held by residents and donestic money
'relo by no1-re"idenLs (Nr I Ma 'Mt )442
It is clear from these deflnitions that only Ml excludes Euro-deposits
and this deftnition, as I^,i11 be seen belolr' is generally not employed by
the oain industrial countries.
The choice of a particular definition of lhe ooney stock depends on
the objectives of nonetary policy. For exanple, in a pure fixed exchange
rate systeo and vith a coordinated policy by the t\ro central banks, the
authorities will be lnterested in the links between real actlvity and
noney at a sorld-uide leve]. In this case, the "correcl" definilton of
noney should encompass all deposits held by nonbanks, both resident and
non-resident, lrrespectlve of the currency in which they are denooinated.
Thus, taklng the assets held by nonbanks ln the u.s. and ROU economies,
we are able co define national Doney stocks (M4) uhich aie coopatible oith
the definition of a l,orld roney supply, in thich Eurocurrency deposits
have to be included:
Mr (us) =u} +vj +nI+u}
''2-L21
M4 (RoW) = Mf + Mf + ud + I1d4242
In conErast if, as is oore 1ike1y in an exchange rate systeE of
managed floating, the authoriEies intend to focus on the relation betveen
Doney and che growEh of the real sector in the hone economy, other concepts
of money sill be nore relevant for the iEplementation of monetary policy.
The definitions employed by the major lndustrial countries suggest that
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the choice betreen these alternatives 1/ a6 targets of monetary policy is
not as straightforward as it night seen. Table 2 presents the definitions
of the targeted nonetary aggregates in the seven major industrial coun-
tries ln t€rns of the concepEs adopted 1n Table 1.
Table 2. Definitions of Targeted tlonetary Aggregates
in l,laior Industrial Countries
Italy
United Kingdon
Canada
U. S.A. - before 1979
Mf
Mf + M,.r
Mf +Md
Mf
4
Mf4+uf2+Mfl
'ur*'uo
+ ltd + lilf + l,1d22
* ,u,
Mdr+ Mdo+ Md,
The U3-type deftnitlon of Eoney targeted by the first tuo countries
above, when associated oith a particular definition of external paFent
imbatances, displays some interestlnS properties lrhich rake uore obvlous
the impact of offshore ftnanclal acrlvirles on the conducr of Eonerary
policy. To illustrate this point, 1et us deflne the uonetary survey of
the U,S, and Rotl econoDies according to the M3 concept, using the con-
solidated balance sheet of the banktng sectors (rolis l and 3 in Table l),
as follows:
1/ On difficulties
economy, see Bryant,
of definlng a 'correct stock of money in an open
1980.
Table 3.
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Monetary SurveY of the U.S.
,nd ROW CounEries
U.S
vis-a-wis residents
vis-a-vis non-residents
( i) banks
(il) non-banks
vis-a-vis residents
vls-a-vis non-r€sidents
(i) banks
(il) non-banks
L, + L"
"z '2
(net foreign assets)
A*= tL:3+ Mfll-tMt3 + Lrll
n*=tr,|o+ Llo 1-1r.r[o + u]ol
2. ROl,l Econony
ul+o2 ,i,,
Lf +Ld44
(net foreign assets)
n=tu1 + r. 1-1rj + n. I
"3 '1 "l 'L
B=[Ld2 + Lf2]-[Md2 + Mf2]
Liabi 1i t ies
t4f + Ild
In the above presentatlon, the credlts and deposits of the banking
sectors have been split between residents and non-resldents, 1n order
to introduce a distlnction shich is necessary for external payuents
analvsis. With such a reorganizatlon the noney stocks (defined as
lt" I N, to. Ro!{ and Hj + lti tor the l.s.) aPpear Lo be, bv
virt,Le of the balance sheet constraint of the financlal internediaries,
the strict counterpart of credit granted either to residents (Lf + Ld[/1
tor RoW ano r-i - r-1 ,o. Ihe U'S.) or net credlt to non-residenr'
"? ,2
(A + B for ROW afld A* + B* for the U.S.).
-9 -
Keeplng ln mtnd thls property of u3, 1et us consider no!, the case
of an lncrease in Eurodollar credit to a ROld resident (ALd4). Eirst, an
increase of the same aEount ls regiscered 1n Md4 aod consequently in M3'
accordlnS to the balance sheet constralnts of the banking sector. Second,
the ROW resldent can choose betueen four posslbilities. He nay:
(i) sel1 hls dollar denominated asset against ROI,I currency to another
restdent non-bank, and thus leave l/ Ml, M{ and Md unchanged;
44
(1i) se11 to the ROIJ banking sector, shlch oill create donestic noney
in counterpart. In this case U3 is not affected, since the increase in Mf,
i6 maLched by a decrease in M, Note that, in Lhe Lrad.itlonal Lexlbook q
piesentatlont an lncrease in the money supply (lEp11ciEly define as Mf4)
is lnduced by the sale of forelan currency to the central bank. tn this
case, by contrast, the increase 1n lhe noney supply stens fron the initial
expanslon of credit ir forelgn currenctes.
(lit) sell to a non-resldenti the effect on the coDposition and
1eve1 of M3 ls the sane as in (ii). A (everse rovenent t,ill be reglstered
in the }L aod 11. accounEs of non-resldents. Ftna11y, if the non-resident
"z 'z
cransfers his Euro-depoqit to che US banklng sector, there ltilt be a slm-
EeLrical reducElon ln u: and M, r,hlch does not affect the noney stockso3 o2
in Rol,l. but lncreases tha( in the Us (increase In M1 and decreasc o,,
the asier slde or u1 t. !2
(iv) transfer the proceeds to a US resident account in the US banking
sector ln order to pay for lnports. In this situation, the noney stock
1,111 decrease in ROW and u111 lncrease In the US.
Thus, l,tth such a definition of noney, it appears that an increase in
Eurodollar credit Eo RoI,l residents can have different effects, depending
on the way the loan is used. As long as Ehe Eurocurrency is enployed
between ROl,/ resldents, only Ehe ROU Boney 6upp1y is lnvolved. 2/ It Lhe
1/ only balance sheet constrainEs are considered. In particula., the
possible effects of price variations and consequenl porcfolio adjustrents
among all sectors are neglected.
U tre iAnote here the necesslty for Eurobanks to hold Dinlnun cash
balances in donestlc do11ars. After 1979, thls orisslon 1s legitir0ate,
since liabillties of home financial interoediaries to foreign banks are
not included in the US ootrey stock (see Table 2).
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proceeds of the Eurodollar loan are used to settle a purchase of US goods,
only the US Doney stock is affected. Fina11y, an increase is registered
in both the US and ROW money stocks vhen the Eurodollar credir is used
to initiate a capital transfer betreen the RoW and US banking sectors.
This double counting results fron the fact that 1lablliEies toward the nor
resident non-bank sector are ex.fuded fron rhe U3 definiEion of rh€ noney
supply. This result is consistent slrh rhe underlying assunprion of this
definition: nanely that from Ehe point of vie, of the growth of noDlnal
doDestic product, only noney held by residents natters. If the deposirs
of non-resident non-banks vere included (Ma), the rransfer of a Eurocur-
rency deposit in the donestic banking sector of the lssuing counEry voufd
have offset the initial measured increase in RO money stock and would
have increased that of the US (1.e., the situatlon of France, Canada and
the United States after 1979). Moreover, if all non-resident deposits(banks and non-banks) vere part of the Doney supply (as in the United
States before 1979), neither the US nor Rol,{ uould have been affecred.
The asset-sector matrix in Table l can also be used to study rhe
effect of Eurodollar activities on rhe balance of paFents, The cunutated
current account surplus of the ROl,l countries (BOP) derermines their net
clains on the U.S. econoDy: these claims are depicted in the balance
sheets of the US and ROI,] banking sectors. The external positton (NI) of
ROW countries is built up by rakinS the net poslrlon of rhe non-residents(bank and nonbank posltions are ieferred to by the l€tters A and B for
Rofi and A*, B* for US in Table 3) in the ROW banking sector, and the ner
posltion of the Row residents in the US banking sector (B*).
Thus, the RoW and US exEernal positions, respectively, can be defined
NE = A+B-B*
NF* = A*+B*-B
and since A = -A*, we have necessarily NE = -NF*. The iDbalance on the
current account corresponds directly to the variation of this external
posiEion, which inplies thatr BoP = ANr' = A(A+B-B*). It appears clearly
that the flnancing of BOP disequilibrirm can be channelted either through
the donestic bankinS sector (B), that ls, in Eurodollars and domestic cur-
rency, or directly via the foreign banking sector in doi0estic dollars (B*)
or external Rol,J currencies.
Hovever, lt is possible to adopt a more restrictive concept of th€
external position (NTA) of a country by keeping on rhe rlght hand side of
the identlty only the financial relations I,lth non-residents registered
in the donestic banklnS sector. ln that case the haslc balance posirion
is defined as follows:
BOP+AB*=ANFA=A(A+B)
This definition is particularly useful 
'hen it is associated wirh rhe tr3noney supply concept 1/ (see Tabre 3). lt indicates rha. variarions ln-
the noney supply are the strict counrerpart of variarions of credir granted
to residents, and of the basic balance position.
In order to clarify the impact of Eurodollar operations on the baslc
balsnce so defined, the assets and liabiliti€s of non-residents nust be
reorganized according to their currency denoDinarlon. Dividing NEA accord-
in8 to this criterlon pennits us to define the followlng trro net positionsr
- 
tt 
-
dol1ar lending cu or borrowina rro.n
- 
(L: +M, )1, whi. h represenLs the
'3 "2
ln domestic doliars plus net lending
net assets held
in Eurodollars to
borrowing froo, US residenrs:
of a Eurodoftar credit to
four hypotheses of lhe
( i) the net
NFA,=[(Hj + L, )
"2
by th€ Row banks
US residents;
(ii) the net Row currency lendina to, or
\rA_ - I(L_ rL.)-(r1. +M.)1.
' '1 -2 'l '2
Using these deflnitions, we analyze the impact
a RoW resident on the basic balance, sith the
exanple discussed earller.
(i) In the first and second cases, the proceeds of the Eurodollar
Ioan are used to settle transactlons betr^,een ROW residents. Thus, the
basic balance is not lnvolved and the US economy is not affecred by Ehe
use of the dollar as a means of paynent between non-residents. uowever,
this assertion is relevant only under rhe assuptions of a fixed exchanAe
rate systen.2/
(ii) In the third case, the capiral flos thar occurs berveen ROW
residents and US residents does not alter the basic balance; a Dodifi-
cation will sinply be registered in rhe disrribution of NFA between NFAd
and NFAf; the increase in the forEer will be offset by a decrease in the
1/ It is worth noting that with such a definirion of the external posi-
the basic balance,
even in the absence of central bank intervention.
2/ In the alternative case, the sale of a dotlar-denoEinated asset
against Rol, currency uould have prompted an exchange rate varlation which
cot1ld result in an alterarion of the currency disrribution of portfolios
held by US residents and non-residents, and thus, could affect the basic
balance position.
tion, the Doney stock can be alter€d by rhe chanse in
- 
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(iii) In the fourth case, the settlement of ioports fron the USA
vrith the pioceeds of the Eurocredit results ln a decrease in NFAd, ouina
to the reductton in Md through the change in the domestic do11ar assets
L
hpld by lhe Rok bdnks (M: ), ,rl'i.h makes up ror the basic bdrdn,e
deterioraEion. ll 3
Thus, the use of a Eurodollar credit by a Row resident iri11 affect
the US/Row basic balance position only if the loan is enployed to buy
goods or services (ABOP) or net assets (AB*) ln the US econony.
It is Hoith noting that, in the last exanple, the change observed in
the US noney stock is consistent lrith the variation registered in the
balance of paluents position, for lre have adopted consistent definitions
of money and balance of payments. Let us assloe, for instance, that the
balance of payrents position had been expressed on an rofflcial settle-
rents' basis. Since an lDport palrent flnanced sith the proceeds of a
Eurodollar credit does not involve variations in the net foreign assets
of central banks, the balance of pa)'lrents situation so defined is not
affected, but u3 noney stocks ,ould have been altered.
In surn, fron the sinple analytical frameirork presented in thts sec-
tion, one can draw the fo1lowin8 conclusions:
(i) For a Siven leve1 of activity, the relative size of an externalfinanclal narket is a functlon of the degree and nature of financial regu-
lations. But its developnent depends on other factors, mainly the real
growth of international demand;
(ii) A clear understandins of the effects of external financial mar-
kets on dorestic money stocks and balance of paylents positions requires
the use of cotrsistent deflnlttoos of these variables. The donestic and
foreign currency deposits held by lesidents in the donestic banking system(M3) and the basic balance are, for most purposes, the relevant concepts.
Accordina to these definitions, a Eurodollai loan to a R0 resident will
affect both the balance of paFrents and US noney stocks only if the
proceeds ale used in the US econony. Othersise, the developnent of Euro-
dollars transactlons betreen ROtl residents does not affecE the US econony.
This concluslon, hovever, is alvays valid only in a pure flxed exchange
rare systen vith perfecr cerrainty. If nor, rhe lnternational use of the
Eurodollar betueen ROW resldents could result ln exchange rate variations
shich will alter in turn the US balance of palments posltlon and noney
supply.
l/ For an opposite view on the
of transactions in Eurocurrencies
see Basevi (1973) and Niehans and
between tho develoutrent
of pa)ments posltion
interrelations
and the balance
Hewson ( 1976 ).
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III. Credit and Money Creation: Th. si t,,ati on Alter 1974
lf sates of other US securities are excluded, Eurobanks, takeD in rtre
aSSregate, essentially have three vays ao do this:
The simplified irorld described in Section II ignores such conpLlca-
tions as Ehe role of high-powered doney, the distinction between demand
and term deposits, and specific aspects of national flnanclal regulations.
In such a world it nakes little difference wheEher the ROH banks create
credit and money in donestic or foreign curreilcies. ln thc real vorld,
the capacity to supply credits in Eurodollars ultinately depcnds oD the
Eurobanks' ability to hold dollar-denominated transactions balances wirh
the US banking system, in the saDo way as th€y hold reserves at their
national central bank as the basis for domestic deposits and loans.
For example, assune that a Brazilian inporter uses a ELrrodollar
loan to settle his imports froD cerDany, His Eurobank will have ro make
a transfer from its denand deposit account in US bank A to the Cernran
exporEerrs account in US bank B, or to anothcr Eurobank in which rhe CerEan
exporter holds his liquid assets. It is wctl knom that the snaller are
the leaka8es from the Eurodollar market, l/ the loser is Ehe Eurobanks,
refinancing requirenent i the U.S. doDestic Darket and Ehe hiSher the
nultiplier etfect. 2/ lrrespective of the anount of redeposits and the
stability of the nultiplier, it ronains a fact that the Eurobanksrability
to expand their Eurodollar credits depends, in the lasr resorr, on rheir
capacity to acquire clains on U.S, banks. 3/
(i) borrowing domestic dollars fron a US resident or from a US bank;(ii) borro,ing domestlc dollars from a private oi public nonresident;(iii) borrowing a forelgn currency and buying dollars either on behali
of their custoners or in a deliberate attenpt to speculate in
favor of the dollar.
If the first possibility is not allowed because of exchange resrric-
tions then the tiurodollar Darket is isolated from the US doDestic narket.
Consequently, the resources of ahe offshore banks wilt be resrricted ro
l/ fl, r. is 
- 
.wre(ri. in.redse in Ld dnd l1d dnd no ,l.Jnse i,r
I r'l - Ll I
2/ Various oore or less sophisticaEed versions of the mirltlplier
approach, usually applied Eo fractional reserve systens, have bean pro-
posed to explain thc growth of the Euromarket. The nosE elaborate ver-
sion of this th€sis is Iound 1n lrillms (1976).
3/ On the non-applicability of the money-nultipller hypothesis to Lhe
analysis of th. vorkinSs of the Eurocurrency market see llasera (1971).
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the cuoulated dotlar balances - ortginatlnS frofl rhe lls BOp deflcit 
- 
thar
non-US residents are ut11in8 to maintain abroad, InteresE rates on loans
and deposits w111 result from clearing rhe oarket berireen the deDand for
credit and the supply of Eurodeposlrs by non-residenrs, the spread berween
the ti,ro rates being a reflection of rhe profir margin of the offshore
Thls outllne depicts roughly rhe condirions that prevalled on the
Eurodoltar market prlor to 1974 j.t a regulatory climate of "voluntary
foreign crediE restraint ln the U.S." However, following rhe removal of
nost of these restrlctions in January 1974, the Euro- and domestic do11ar
markets ,ere reintegrated; 1/ arbirraSe rended to equalize rheir interesr
rates, and dlfferences in reserve requirements inposed on resident and
non-resident deposits accounted for rhe remaining spread. It does notfollos, however, that the lnreresr rare on the dol1ar and Eurodollar are
both deternlned simultaneously by rhe global denand for credits and supply
of deposits in dollar and Eurodollar. U,S, inEerest rates ultimarely
depend on the Donetary policy of the Federal Reserve. If a quanritarive
objective is adopted for the nonetary base, rhe Doney marker interesr
rate becoues endogenous, and vice versa with a policy of pegging the
interest rate. In the latter case, lrhich is characterized by a sluggish
adaptation of the interest rate instrunent, noneEary policy is highlyprocyclical and banks are not prevented froD increasing their supply of
credit by the lack of high-posered ooney. FurtherDore, if loans are
booked lrith variable interest rates, or if rhe maturities of credits and
are matched, even the interest rare variations ri11 nor impinge
on bank proflts and thus uill leave rheir capacities ro supply credit
unimpaired. Banks, under these assumptions, are able to sarlsfy any
denand for credit at the i0oney narker interest rate plus a spread relared
to the risk attached ro rhese assers.
Such a situatlon prevailed on the donestic and !:urodollar narkers upto October 1979, Thus iE is acceprable ro assue rhat during the 1974-1979
period, Eurobanks uere not hlndeied in their lendina acrivity by lirits ontheir borrouings on US dolDestic financial narkers. Consequenrly, they
were willing to satisfy all of the demand rhat was present at rhe rare
exogenously deEerx ined by the policies of rhe Federal Reserve. 2/ This is
the basic hypothesis adopted in the parEial equilibriun model presenredin Section VI.
1/ In Hartman ( 1980) a test on veekly data shous that the interdepen-
significantlydence betveen Euro- and domesric-dotlar inEeresr rates is
stronSer afrer 1974 than before.
2/ For a derailed discussion of the hypothesis of d emand-de terntned
Eurodollar credit, see HeIrer ( 1979 )
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The extent to which Eurodollar activirles were responsibte for the
expansion in national or world non€y suppiies during rhe period 1974-1980,
and possibly for excess lnflarionary pressur€s raises tro questionsr a
methodological question concernilg the operatlve deftnitlon of noney, and
an enpirical quesrion concerning the growrh of Eurodollar balances mea_
sured in real terns, relative to expanslon of rhe volume of inrernationaltransactions that are assumed to be sertled uith theD, The first quesrion
\,ras covered 1n Secrion II. The financial data needed ro tackle the secondquestlon direcrly are not available. Nevertheless, an analysis of maruritytransforDation can provlde sone indirect insights on Ehe subject. 1/ Thisis not to say that financlal transforoation is in itself inflation;ry; bur
very often, a high leve1 of rransformarion is an indicarion rhar banks are
allowed Lrnrestralned direcr or indlrect access ro the Eonetary base of thecentral bank, rhus rhrearening irs abltiry to conrrol rhe money supply.
The data presented in
assets in the Euronarkets,
ques tion. These data calI
Table 4, covering roughly 50 per cent of grossgives a quallfled poslrive answer to Ehe secondfor the following observations:
(1) The classiflcation based on rhe originat narurity resutrs in anoverestination of the actual degree of naturlry transforEarion, Houever,the amount of naturity transfornatton is so large that eliminarion ot thisbias lrould be unllkely ro change rhe basic conctusion siAnificanrly.
(ii) The exisrence of rhls hlgh degree of rransfornatlon supporcsthe_previous argunent relating ro the absence of linits on the supply ofcredit by offshore banks. Ir neans rhat Eurobanks ale able ro refinance
theoselves on a short-rerD basis sirhout restratnrs, by adjusting debrorinterest rates on nediunFterm credlts ro the cosr of rheir resources. The
only ltmits shich could affect the credtr supply,ould be created by pos-
s1b1e losses stenDlng froo the default of hlghty indebred customers. Euro_banks, of course, try to protect rhenselves against such uncertainries
through syndicatlon of loans anong large aroups of internediaries.
IV. Sources and Uses of Funds in Ehe
The Non-Banks' Behavior in the
Eurodollar Market:
Recent Period
The consolldated
interbanklng relations
and central banks, has
balance sheet of Eurobanks
between ROH countries and
the follolrtne form:
, U atter netting out rhe
consolidarlna non-banks
1/ An analysls of the lra@
system for the year 1973 was firsr presenred in Niehans 
""i H.""""
Klng(1976).
A conparison of Eheir results wirh those of Table 4 shoss rhat rheof financial transformatlon has severely increased slnce 1973.
! 1", ." exhausrive presentation of the accounting nechanisn ofEurodollar marker, one can refer to c. Aubanet (1975).
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Table 4. Maturtty Analysls of lhe L1ab111tles and Clatms tn Foreign
Currencles of the French and Engllsh Banklng Systeos (*)
to Non-Banks (orlgtnal llaturlty Classlflcation)
Liabilities
U.K. French U.K. French
Table 4.1
r.ess than 6 Donths 36.22 43.82 94.32 92.0"1
6 Donths to I year
1 year and over
6.4
\2.t+
6.1 2.5
3.2
4.5
3.5
Table 4.2 (Disaggregatlon of the first rine of Table 4.1)
Less than 8 days 9.62 31 .87.
8 days to I Donth 9.4 22.9
Less than 3 Donths
l nonth to 6 months
3 nonths to 6 nonths
100 100 100 100
32.72 15.O7
11 ,2 33.6
tl. tit t7 .oz
36.2 43.8 94 .3 92.O
* Data on UK banks oliginate fron the quarterly bulletin of the Bank of
Ensland and are restricted to Brilish and Anerican banks. Record da.e ls
NoveDber 19, 1980. Data on French banks originate from unpublished sources
of the Banque de France and are restricted to 145 banks. Record date is
end of DeceDber, 1980.
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Tabl€ 5. Consolldated Balance Sheet of Eurobanks
Liabilities
(I) clains on us banks (u;3)
(3) Loans to non banks (US and
ROW residents: LaO + Lar),
and official nonetary
f2r Liabilities ro US banrs (11 )dl
(4) Deposits of non banks (uS and
ROli residents: Md + lld ),42
and official roonetary
institutions,
(5) Exchange position of the Rot,l
To relate this franevork to Sectlon II, one notes that RoW central
banks nol, hold deposits and recelve credlts in Eurodollars, and that a new
iten (5) has been introduced to balance the do1lar assets and llabiliries
of the RoH bankln8 sector: the spot exchange positlon of the Eurobanks.
The deternination of the actual position sould requlre rhe introduction
of the net for"ard cover taken by the banks either for their own accounr
or on behalf of the non-banks. 1/ Finarly, the inbalance berveen iteDs(1) and (2) deternines the net posiclon of the ROI,J banks toward the US
banking systeD: the "unborroued of the Eurodollar market.
In order to ascertain the role of the dollar as an internationat cur-
rency, let us conslder the evolution of Eurodollar activities during the
perlod 1974-79, 2/ As lllustiated ln the table presented in Appendix I,
loans and deposits exhiblted sinilar rates of grovth (19.3 per cent and
21.4 per cent respectively) on an average annual basis. It can chus be
inferred that the fluctuations of net position in domestic dollars by th.
l/ The aclual exchange position of the Eurobanks is usualiy negllglbte,
for they act generalty as covered interest arbitrageurs. See Knight 1977.
Therefore iEem (5), here is assu,ned to depend on the behavlor of non-banks
and ,i11 be oerged with item (4) rater.
2/ BIS data concerning the 14 Dain lndustrial counrries, plus rhe
activitles of the branches of US banks ln the Carlbbean area. AddinS
other offshore centers (Asia and }llddle Easr) would increase the Darket
size by roughly 15 per cent.
- 
la 
-
Table 6. Evolutlon of Consolidated Eurodollar
Balance Sheet of CoDnercial Ranks 1914/1979
(End of year figures in billions of U.S. dollars)
Liabilities
Central banks
ROW residents
5.t (5 .6"1)
6.7 (1 .4)
78 ,6 (87.0)
(8.22>', .
(5.3)'
(86.5)
30.4 (38.0%)
8.3 ( ro.3)
4 r.3 ( 5r.7 )
18.A (31 .OZ)
12,0 (2O.4)
90.8 (43.0)
90.4
Lt.8
17.7
189.1
218.6 80.0 ? 10.8
Row banks - lteD (t) ninus iteD (2) - were raEher more i fluenced by the
speculative behavior of non-banks to,ards the dollar than by the expansion
of Eurocredits. Furthernore, a perusal of Table 6 reveals nainly:
(i) There is considerable stability in the dlsEribution of loans, as
opposed lo a siSnificant change in the breakdown of the resources bet,een
US and ROw residents;
(ii) The loans to US non-bank residenEs represent a snall and
decreasing part of the narket. This inplles that roundtrip' oPerations
are treg1lg1b1e with regard Eo the internatlonal use of the do11ar. Accord-
ingly, in the follosing, emphasis is placed solely on the use of Euro-
dollars by ROW residents.
Keeping these facts in nind, consider now the behavior of non-banks
and its relation to the rapid groirth of Eurocredit since 1974. Td finan.e
internationai trade or purchases of foreign assets, Rot non-bank residents
have to make declslons anons (i) currencies, (ii) bankins sectors, (iii)
and types of liability.
(i) The choice of the currency is deEermined by the structure of
conmercial contracts, which restricts the involcing of international trade
to the currencies offering the largest possibilities of refinancing, i.e.:
the currencies of the nain lndustriat countries. Data published by the
Bank for InEernational Settlenents (dr-rrine 1973l1979 the share of the
dollar in Eurocredlts ftuctuated betweeD 70 and 73 per cent) and the
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lnvoiclng structure in foreign currencles of French international trade(see Appendix II) eDphasize the domlnance of the dol1ar and the stability
of the currency distrlbutlon' l4oreover, it Is lorth noting that, in the
naln tndustrial countries, the predor0lnant portion of export financlng
conslsEs of Ioans in dooestlc currencies. They are frequently subsidized
and, for lona-tern crediti granted on a discretionary basis and publicly
(tl) The choice of the banklng sector is closely tinked to the loca-
tion and natlonallty of the exporter. A firn tradlng ln several .ountrles
tends to reduce its banking costs by deallng uith a llmited nuxober of
banks, usually banks of the traderis natlonality and well established on
a ,or1d-iride basis. A recent survey ]/ points out that "banklng relatlons
already establlshed rrithin the natlonal 11.0its of the eultinational coF
porations houe country Day be reproduced in host countries." In fact,
export trade financing in foretgn currencies ls concentrated 1n a 1im'ited
nunber of banks with a nultlnational structure 2/ lnvolving branches and
subsidtaries throuShout the uor1d. For instance, the predoninant posltion
of a fel,l Anerican, Britlsh, Swiss, French, Gernan, and Japanese banks is
i,e1l known,
(111) Traders have access to three forEs of financinS; short- aDd
Eediun-tern credlts, and bonds. The short-term toans 1n foreign currencies
are dellvered to settle lnports or for the speculative purpose of traders
l'ho are expectlng a depreclatior of the borrosed currency. , Thus,
expected speculative profits account for the essentlal part of the substi-
tutlon betseen the short-tern assets ln foreiSn currencles. The doolnance
of short-tern over Long-terio financing (two thlrds of international trade
1s settled on a short-terE basis) exacerbates the cotrsequences of this
phenomenon for the exchanae narket. Conversely, for the nedlm and long
terE, the possibilltles of substltution are far nore Iimlted' slnce access
to lnternational bond narkets ls restrlcted nalnly to Eajor Dultlnational
corporatlons and lonrtero credlts ln dodestlc currency are roost often
granted on a discretionary basis.
For these reasons, one can vlew long-term Eurocredits as part of an
internatlonal market that i6 highly segnented, partlcularly along loca-
tional and national crlterla. This implies that denand for Eurodollar
credlts depends nalnly on the evolution of lnternational trade amonA RoU
1/ See otivter Pastte, ( l98f) .
Z/ See J.M. and A.P. cray, (1981).
3/ In the balance sheet of the Eurobanks (Tab1e 5) thls behavior slll
translate into an increase in iteD (3) xnatched by a decrease in iten (1).
They can atso sell forward this currency, tn whtch case, there rlll be a
decrease in itens (5) and (1), assuDlne that Eurobanks are not taking an
open posltion.
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countxles anal between the Unlted States and RO1'l countrles' on the expectedpioiits resurtrng fron short-tern assets substltutlon' and on the dol1ar
real lnterest late. Thls facEor accounts for the substltullon ln the bor-
roslng countrles, betueen assets and reat goods (current account surPlus
or lncreaslng lndebtedness).
The ltabillty side of the Euronarket, net of lnterbank clalrs held
bet.reen ROIJ banks, is conPosed essentlallv of short-tero resources (see
Section III) origlnattng froE four agents: the ROtl central bankE and
non-bank US residents anal Row residents (1ten 4) and US donestic banks(iten 2). The vte!, is tsken here that after the reDoval of restri'rioos
on lendlng to non-residents ln 1974 the deposits of the above nentloned
"g".rt" l""rr. vlrtualty perfect substitutes 
1/ fron the point of viep of
Eurobanks. Therefore, 1n expandlng their i;debtedness to{ard US residents(bank or non-bank), the offshore banks were alwavs able, until 1980' to
replenlsh their resources at a 1eve1 shich oeets the denand for Erlrocredits
at an interest rate exogenously deterDlned by the Federal Reserve (see
Sectlon III) .
Concerning llabitities to non-residents' the lnportance and stabillty
of the central banks' share (see Table 6) is sorth notina' In sPite of
the increase h exchange rate variabtlitv after 1973, central banks as a
group do not seen Eo have sianificantly altered their PorEfolio-behavlor
wftn_respect to the doI1ar, which reEairs lhe nain lnternational currency'
v. A Model of the Eurodollar Market
The nodel presented ln Ehis section is noE designed to deal wlth theq"."ti;;" artstirg from the overall iEpact of the Eurodollar credits on the
linited States and i,rorrd noney suPPlies and balance of paluents disequt-
7i-bri.a.2l This is a partlal adjustx0ent model restricted to the analysis
of the expansion of the banking actlvities in foreign currencles, under
the budget constraint presented ln Table 5. Wlth respecE to thls fraDe-
vork the onty sinplification consists in the aggreAation of the spot
exchange position of the Eurobanks (Tab1e 5, item (5))' to the Euro-
deposits of the non-bank s€ctor (Table 5' iteD (4))'
The model appears in tlto versions, according to uhether Eurodollar
interest rates rd and r are assuned to be exogenous (verslon A) or endoge-
nous (version B). It ts conposed of one budget constraint and five behav-
ioral equatlons in the first case, and one budget constralnt and four
equations in the second.
1/ AE leasE
2'/ ror more conprehensive nodets, see rratlani (1970), Freedman (1977
I,L-Levy-Garboua (19i8) and It. Chesquiere (1980)' ror a recent eropirical
study eoploying the parEial adjustnent franework, see KniSht (1977)'
ror tl* aeposits ot Eore than s100,00o. ),
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The definitions of the warlables are given below:
(i) S)'mbo1s
EAB
ELB
PW
rd
EA = Eurodollar credits (short and long terD) to non-banks
and official monetary instltutlons (Table 5, iten (3)).
EL = Eurodeposits of non-banks and official nonetary institu-
tions, includins the exchanse position of Eurobanks(rahle 5, item (4) + tten (5)).
Claims of Eurobanks on U.s. banks (Table 5, iten (1)).
Borrowings of Eurobanks fron U.S. banks (Tabie 5,
item (2)).
world lnports expressed ln b111lons of do1lars.
World import unit value.
Three-Eonth lnterest rate on Euiodollar loans to non-banks.
Three-nonth lnterest rate on Eurodollar deposlts of non-
U.S. noney narket lnterest rate (three-month Treasury
Bilt rate),
Welghted aweraSe of the three-monEh interest rates (I)
of Euro-nark, Euro-ster1lng, and Euro-Srriss franc l,ith
the respective weights (r,) 0.54, 0.1r, 0.25:
I a,,f1 + re) = II (l+Ik) ^
k=l
expected va1ue of the ireiShted effective exchanae rate of
the do11ar against the deutsche mark, sterling-and Soiss
franc by non-bank borrowers. An increase in e neans that
the horrowers are expecting a deprectation of the dollar.
expected return on speculative behavior; consisting of
borrowing dollars and huylng foreign currencles, with:
(1 +D) = (1 +e) (1 +re\(1 + r)
The annual rate of lnf1atlon of the Us cup alrrator.DPUS =
RQR - U.S. reserve requlleEents regulatlon on non-resldent
deposlt6 (exlstence of reserve requtrements: RQR = 0;
non-exlstence of reserve requlreEents: RQR = I)'
RT = U.s. requlred reserve ratlo on non-resldents deposits'
( 11) Equations:
Version A of the Model:
In this veislon, Eurobank borrowings fron the US doDestic Earket(ELB) 1/ are assuneal to be exogenous. Thls situation occurs r^'hen the US
authoriries ltDlt or forbld the lendinS of U.S. dollars to non-residents'
To simplify, lt is assuned that ELB covers the holdings of both the pri-
vate and banking U.S. sectors. Under this hypothesis interest rates on
deposits (rd) and loans (r) are sioultaneouslv deternined in the Euro-
dollar oarket by the supply and derand functions for credlts (EAs, EAd)
and deposlts (ELs, ELd). Since the ioterest rate in the U'S' domestic
oarket (rus) rs iss,,roed to be exogenouslv glven, one equation is strffi-
cient to account for the denand for U.S. dooestic assets (EAB) bv the off-
shore banks. If one includes the equaEior explainlng the expected return
on uncovered arbltrase (P), nodel A is designed to ensure Ehe slnnltaneous
deterDinaLion ol six endogFnous varlables: EA, EL, IAB, i. 
', 
ta'
The nodel Is specifled as follows:
Endogenous Exogenous
(1) ELB
MW
PU
RT
RQR
DPUS
EI,
rd,
p
EL
EA
'l
'l
.. *t
[*,
1,,
EA,
LPV
[",,
zu
EAl= rPlr 1 EA3
(2>
(3)
(4)
(5 )
EL
!4! = rPll3
rd
= f4 [r,
= . ["',5l
rel
EA8 t EArd
(6) EAB + EA = ELB + EL
Wlth rd < ru8 (1 - RT) and shere equatlon (5) ls detlved fron the
optlDlzatlon of the proflt functton of the Eurobanks, assunlng that thelr
productlon functlon has a Cobb-Dou81as forE:
(7) Y = Yo ELo ELBt-s
shere a < l and Y is Ehe value added by the offshore bankina operatlons. 1/
Verslon B of the nodel:
Endogenous variables Exogenous variables
ELB
EAB
EL
PW
RT
RQR
PUS
rd
MW
P
In verslon B of the uode1, equatlon (5), (irhlch can be considered
as a supply function for Eurodollar loans) ls rexnoved, slnce 1t is assuned
that, in the absence of regulation, the lnterest rates (r, rd) ate deter-
nined on the doDestlc U.S. noney market. As we are interested 1n the
grordth of the Eurodollar market slnce 1974, the stress wt11 be put on the
spectficatlon of the equations of oodel B. First conslder the equatlon of
the denand for credit. It is a reduced form of the g1oba1 lnternational
deinand for credit (IC).
tl Eurobanks naxtntze a proflt functton of the fol1olring form:
P 
= Ir,EA + rus.EAB - rd.EL - rus.ELBI under thetr balance 6heet constraint(equatlon 6) and thelr productlon fuoctlon (equatlon 7). Then the lagran-
gtan function becoEes: P = [r.EA + rus.EAi - rd.EL - rus.ELB] + llEA + EAB
- 
y- ELc ELBo-I1. Uslng lhe dertvattves of the lagranglan agalnst EL
and"EA, se obtaln an equatlon lInklng the lnterest rates on loans (r) and
deposlts (rd): rd = or. Y.Yo
EL
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(8) rc=EA+DA
- ta-[ h-
,,o\ Tc r4J rlr+r ttt
' ffi PtJ l-; riPrrs l
rtot E1 = (1+ f) 1'rc
\,here DA represents all the other lnternattonal folms of financing in
domestic dollars and other foreign currencies. It follows that the equa-
tion of demanC for credits on the Eurodollar market can be expressed as:
( ) 11 = ,'ru''l 
.l+ 
' 
b)rl*i,'l
P!' LPIJ ] + DPLIS
where the partial derivatives have the follosing expected signs:
a1 > o, b1 ( 0, c1 ) 0
and rhere a1 and b1 constitute the elastlcltles of the g1obal interna-
tional denand for ftnancing wlth respect to \ror1d trade and the real
interest rate, respectively. The c1 coefflclent measures the substl-
tutabllity between credit in Eurodollars and flnanclng in other curren-
cies. AccordinS to our hypothesis (see Sectlon III), thls substitu-
tahility concerns nainly the short end of the narket.
Equation (12) of liabilities to non-banks has the following forlll:
b" -."
,,". rl. l:Al fl + r) ' rl I D) '
Pq \PI,
wlth 0 > a2 ) 1, b2 ) 0, c2 <0.
It can be considered analogous to the denand for money, in which real
ELEurodollar balances denanded (-) depend on transactions, precautlonary,
PW
and speculative motives. The transaction varlahle (MI.]), honever, has been
replaced by Eurocredit (EA) ln order to compute directly the lntenslty of
the redeposit effect on Euromarket, Speculative behavior is proxled in
the at,ove equacion by the expected proflt on uncovereil aibitrage (1+;).
The nominal interest rate is usually introduced in the demand for money
1/ It ls assuned that the real lnterest rate is the sane anonS the
ro account for lhe dl6tributlon of wealth belween noney and savlng' Irl
tfr..ae. of the Eurodollar market, the data ln Table 4 polnt to the fact
that Euroooney ls nainly oade up of short term deposlts that earn lnteleat '
Thus the slgn of b2 ls expected to be posltive, Ileafllng that the hlgher le
the real lnterest iate ln the Euromarket, the larger I,111 be the deposlts
of non-banks ln thls market. To close the balance shee! of the Etrrobanks
another functlon ls needed; that for claiEs on the lls banks EAB has been
chosen, the hypothesis belng that the resoulces always adapt to dedand'
-, 'r , 
bg d.t
(13) :l-" = !! - (1 + rus' ExP (cl RqR) (I + re).PHPH
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vlth lhe expected partlal derlvatlves:
0 ) a3 ) r, b3 ) 0, ca > 0, d3 <0
The paraDeter a3 plays a central role 1n the analysis of the EutoDarket
through the sinllest approach to the monev Dultiplter (M) defined bv the
ratio EL (see Johnston, 1981). The general forr of the nultlpller that
EAB
is obtatned by combininA equations
1
M = - l-a:ra2 (a3 - 1) ro8Ml,l - (b1a2
a3
- c1a2 (a3-1) los (1+ ?) - b3 log (1 + rus) -d3 1og (1 + re)
- a92 (r - a3) logPw - ca RqR' constantl
rslth the expected signs:
-c1a2 ( a3 - 1)
>0
?
>0
(II), (12), and (13) is:
1+ r
+ b2) (a3-1) loe (:-:--== )
-a1a2 (a3 - 1)
-(b1a2+b2)(a3-1)
-b3 ( 0
-d:)o
-ca(0
-ata2(1 - a3) <0
If one assunes that Eurobanks tend to
donestlc dollars (EAB) proporttonately l,lth
value of a3 must be close to unlty. U[der
lncrease thelr reserves in
the deposlts theY recelve, the
thls assumption, the evolutton
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of the multiplier nainly depends, in the short-run, on the fluctuatr.ons
of the domestic doUar (r\rs)and foretqn (re) interest rates and their
respective parameters b, ana d3 . The higher are their absolut6
values, the higher ts the instabifity 1/ of the nuttiplier, in re5ponseto the vari.abj.lity cf, short-term interest rates. In the _Iong run, the
evolutlon of the multiplier is doninated by the reaf qrowth in
internationaL traae ff il d3 is not strictly 6quat to one. Eor a
value inferior to unity. the muftiplier tends to increase, meaninq thatthe power of monetary creation by Eurobanks tends to rise {ith the
deYelopnent in international transaetions. It is nore sensibler howewer,
to assume o3=1 This lnplies ttlat the multipiier is a negativefunction of lhe inteiest differentials between U.S. and foreign assets
and o{ th6 reserve requirenents on non-resialents' deposits,
The other variables used in eguation (13) are supposed to take into
account tbe speculatlve attltude of the Eurobanks 
--(1 + rus) and {1 +re)- and the specific beharior of, the U-S. banks which atternpt to reducetheir requlied reserves by inclucing a tfansfer of resident d;posits
subnitted to reserves lequirements, to thei! branches abroad ;hen they are
not slmittd to such reqrtations.
The fourth equation deteltnines the expected return on uncoveled
arbitrase (!)
(rs) (i*Fl=(r*a)fl'",)
11+r J
wrrere- (?) 
.the e-xpected exchange rate is expressed, followins Sotnik (1915),as a function of the trlterest rate differentiat:
(16) (1+a)=(t+re)"p
The conbination of equatlons 15 and 16 gives the final refatlon :
1rz) 1r*P1=S'e]1""rgtr+r,
1/ rrgowewe!, the point is not
rather whether the instabiliry
i\ovements in sone independent
whether reBerve hotdinqs are unstabfe but
can be systenatically exptained by
variables, " p.B. Johnston, (1981
The last equation is an
1evel of itrdebtedness of the
(18) ELB = EAB + EA - EL
irhere the slgn of (1 + 0) Is expected
dol1ar (equation 11) and posltive for
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to be negatlve for borrowers
lenders ( equation 12).
of
7.1 the variable (l + p) has been
final functlon of the expected
stennins fron the value of 0 and B
accounting identity which deterDines the
Eurobanks tosards the U.S. bankinS system.
VI. The Epptrical Results
The nodel \ras estinated on a sample of 28 quarterly observations for
rhe period Ql 1974 to Q1 1980, using the Ewo stage least squares xoethod.
The claiDs (EAB) and liab11lties (ELB) of Eurobanks vis-a-vis U.S.
banks uere generated fron the balarce sheet of the U.S. banking system.
Data concerning the loans and deposits of non-banks in Eurobanks are not
coroprehenslve. They L,ere extracted from the reports of the fourteen
industrlal countries to the Bank for lnternational Settleoents' Actlr
itles of U.S. bank branches outside the reportlng area (e.8. in the
Carlbbean) have been added to the BIS data.
Because expected rates are obviously not observable, the paraneters
o and B of equaEion (16) 
'ere estlnaEed by successlve slnulations of the
replaced
return (
(19) (1 + p) =
(20) (r + P) =
In
by
equatlons 11 and 12, Table
its proxy (1 + re). The(1 + r)
p) on speculatlwe borro,lng,
fo11olrlng forn:
-3.82
.1.0797 for borroxers (equaEion Ir, Table 7.I)
+.76(1 + re) .9841 tot lenders (equatlon 12, Table 7,1)(r+-;I
rhlch roeans that on a short-tern basis the higher the interest rate on
the Euiodollar Darket the higher the expected return is for borrovers of
dollars, and the lower for lenders. The estimatlon results are Presented
in the following cable ard the charts of the sinulatlon nay be found in
Appendlx I II.
A11 estinated paraneters have the expected signs, except for the real
interest rate on the Eurodollar in equaEion (11)' In order to obtain
rel1ab1e eDpirical results, the nooinal interest rate ,as used. This
variable appears to be highly slgniflcant. This tDpties either that our
hypothesls concerning the 1ov substitutablllty betoeen lonrtern lnterna-
tional assecs is wrong, or that th€ evolutlon of the troeinal interest rate
t
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Table 7.1. ParaDeter EstiDates (*)(Quarterly Data 1974- I/ 1980-I )
Equation ll:
f,
rog'rrl ..-0o I.d Ml ,.0' rogr t*.r 1.827 llogll+re-l - to8(.98)l - ./oJj
lPu ( \.0. lpL] ,-'12.J) (-12,e) :* _ (-tg.Cr
R2 =.991 DW= 1.39 S= 1.592
\r*, -os [il' .. L.slry- 1.Dl LuB,.r,, -'].11 ltosIr+rel + toB(.c8)] i .00b5 rrFnd - .\uo-14Plr lP (.0.. ) (-b.l) lTr. I (1.2r (.Ja.rl.
R2=.911 DW = 1,05 S= 1.962
EquaEion 12 |
logIELl= .7b" l.dILA r ..ol t.e\ t,r./ 
-./o llosll+re'l + loar.98)t - .014']pi,{ , 
.t .t, Fii' (4.3) ( l.zi T-+r L-2.8,r
Re =.977 Dlr = 1.37 s-2.I2
(.r, | .'LL = .. toe'nel+ 1.4 lu!\l+r./ - .gqltos,lrrel I Loe(,qb)l - .00\r lr.nd .ud,-pr,l lr, (8.8, 1r.r; ir+r 
_] ,-J.)) .-4.t,
R, =.916 DI,= 1.2 S = 2-382
I q-J r.r { lll
ro8IEABI= .9]- rus lr + 9.!b 1o8r L+rus) + .121 RQR - 1.544 ros(r+re) - r.618
Lpw ] r5.7) Lrtr] (e.5) (.2.5) (-1.4) (42,8)
RZ =.gll D|l= 1.7(r s- 4.\\Z
(**) loa EAB = r. IoE[ELl+ 8.89 log(1+rus) + .122 RQR - ].26 to8(1+!e) - 0.0007 Trend - 1.63
Lp,,] 'pl,]] (b.8) (2.5) (-2.8) (-.2) (,35.2
R2=.91 Dl,J=1.7 S = 4.527"
l \u0b, r. 'n n,'r,nrnF. i: b.np-rl. t..r pnrdo,rerb d,< r !dtues.
*{ co.-lrnined F rimdlps rirl' .i L, ii.
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I^hle 7.2. Lass and llelghtg
t-1 L-2 r-3
MI,I
PW
p
.5
.5
.5
.5
,2
.3
.3
.3
.3
.15
.2
.2
.3
.15
.2
Dumy vartables
- RQR is equal to 0 fron Q1 1974 to Q2 1978
- 
RQR ts equal to t fron Q3 1978 to Ql 1980
This vartable takes lnto account the renovlng of the reserve requireoents
1n 1978 on Eurodollar borroldlnSs of U.S. banks.
- A dunmy eliElnates the Q4 1978 potnl tn equatlon 12.
- A dunmy ellnlnates the Q3 1979 point ln equatlon 13.
is plckinS up other factors like the specific risk on off-shore lendings,
or that the importers are subject to nonetary i1lusion. Ilovever, the
assumption of portfolio behavior seens the mosr 1ikely. The reliabiliry
of thcse econometric resulrs is supported by rhe fact thar an estimarion
of the model in absolute variations of loEariEhms produces similar long-
terrn elasticities, accompanied by a normal deteriorarion in rhe srarisrical
tcsts. Thus, the parametars for equarion (11) are rhe folrowing (see in
Appendix IV the graph of actual and estlmared vatues):
- 
30 
-
Table 8. Parameter Estimates of Equarion (11)
Elastici ties at(t value) b1(t valLre) c1(t value) dt(t value)* R2 NU
1.160 (6.6)
I .337
-4.09 (-6.9) -3.6 (4.6) .125 (.9)
-4.69 -4.11
Parameter of the endogenous variable lagged by one quarrer.
Turning now to the two nain parameters of rhe model, rhe esiimated
value of at is 1.4 and the estinated value of a3 is 0.91. The estinares
appoar to be fairly precise, despite the sma11 size of the sanple. Thefact that the first coefficient is significantly hiAher rhan unlry impties
thatt for the 1974-79 period, the volune of lnrernational denand for
credits lncreased faster than the volune of rransactions, This resulr is
consistent with the existence of increasing balance of payments disequi-
libria l/ among nost of the countrles since 1971. Eor rhe same leve1 oflrorld inports, the larAer the inbatance of rhe deficit counrries, the
larger the need for internatlonal credit.
As indicated abov€ the value of a3, ,hich is snaller than unity, seems
to nean that the nultipller tends to increase with rhe volume of inrerna-
tional trade. The standard error of rhe coefficienr, horevcr, is roo larAe
to support thls result. Thus the hypothesis rhat a1 = 1 cannor be
reiected. , The average value of Ehe mutriplier iatculatea uitt tte
1/ An attenpt(atz (1980). to test this hypothesis is found in chesquiere and
2./ In ordar to ensure thar rhe model exhibits consisrent long-rL,n
propcrties, it is necessary to inpose restricrions on the ai paramerers(ai = 1, Vi) and to introduce tine trends (ea1 trend with ,di = O) to
account for structural changes. It is worth notinA rhat conarrained and
unconstrained equations (see Table 7) give very sinilar esrinates for rhehy, ci, and di parameters, and that the sun of trend coefficients 1s, as
expected, not significantly different fron zero.
The conclusion of this econonetrlc work is that the enpirical results
do not contradict the thesis put forrdard, whlch assuxoes that Eurodollar
credit has been totally deDand-determined since the Eurobanks \rere able to
access freely the us donestic money narket.
estlEated value of a3 ls equal to 2.09, a coefflctent hlgher than those
lssued froD earller emplrical studles before 1974. 1/
Looklng at the facEors whlch explain the deEand for Eurodeposits, iE
appears that lhe coefficient c2 of the speculative varlable is not hlghly
signiiicant. The rationale for this result steBs fron the fact that EL
includes non-banks atrd cdntral banks deposits; the speculative behavior
of the former tends to lncrease the reserves of the latter, i,ho redeposit
on the Euronarket, thus offsettlrS partlally the initial outflor'.
Fina1ly, a careful exaDination of the simulations in Appendir. III
does not reveal any statistlcal blas; this is a crucial polnt especlally
ln the case of the ELB variable whlch, steDning fron an accountlng iden-
tlty, is nore 1iable to statistlcal bias, due to the sna11 slze of the
sanple used for the estimalion.
vrr. !9r4rg9!-i1llq!!.1-E!I9q
Devoted to the analysis of the Eurodollar narket, particularly stnce
1974, thls paper contalns three argrDents. The first concerns Ehe neces-
slty to choose suitable concepts of noney supply and balance of paluents
in order to ascertain the effects of the developnent of Eurodollars on the
world econoDy. The second, based on statistical data orlglnatlng fron
France and the United KlnSdom, supports the evidence that Euronarket
expanslon resulted in an important transforEation of short term
into long ten0 credit i.,hich could be an aftermath of Ehe peaginS interest
rate policy of the rederal Reserve lrhlch added to the lrorld inflattonary
pressuresr The third tends to deEonst.ate that the expanslor of Euro-
dollar credlt has been totally denand oriented la 797411979 perlod, osing
to the suppiession of the U.S. exchanae controls, Ehe lnterest rate policy
adopted by the Federal Reserve and the generalization of varlable lnterest
rate on credit. The results obtained fron an emplrical Dodel do not con-
trad lct thls assurnptlon.
In response to concern about this potential for credit creation on
the Eurodollar narket, central bankers 1n the rajor lndusEiial countries
have collaborated in studying the possible implexoenration of a systeio
of reserve requirements, It ls clear that the oain consequence of such
1/ ln liewson and Sakakibara (1974), the average value of the nultiPller
is 1.6 on the 1968-72 perlod.
requirenents, if inplenentation were feasibla all over the sorld' would
be a decrease in the profllability of financial internediailon in the
Euromarket, since the interest rates on toans and deposits can be con-
sidered doterninad in the Us donestic market in the absence of exchanSe
controls. The transfer of activities toward the national bankinS systeDs
which could result from such measures irould depend on the tevel of the
reserve reqrirenents i the Euro-rarket, and irould be hanpered by the
existence of captive exchange control in many countries prevents
residents from holding bank accounts abroad, and some goveroaents, for
political reasons, prefer to hold their intarnational reserves in dollars
outslde the Llnited States.
Another possible approach, which would affect Ehe competitlveness of
onshore and offshore banking €qually, would be to forbid the practice of
grantlng credits which have variable interest rates; The Federal Reserve
interest rate policy wourd be able to increase the riskiness of lon8-terD
internatiotraf credit financing for the financial internediaries and would
prompt a decrease in the existing financial transforDation. Obviously the
impleDentation of such proposals would not be easy, since their efficiency
presupposes ao agreenent amonS all countries, includinS the most exotic
offshore centers.
Other proposals 1/ aim at lnposing a quantitaEive limit on th. ano,,nr
of Eurodollar deposits that Eurobanks would be entitled to accePt. It
is clear that such meastlres are unsuitable if the free circulatlon of
capital, and convertibitlEy of currencies, are to be naintained. There_
fore, leavinS aside this last hypothesls, lt is 11ke1y that these regu-
lations \ri11 not be sufficient to cope with Ehe Eurocredit expansion.
Consequently, the control of noney creation vill depend, in the fast
analysis, on the central banks of the issuing countries (mainly United
States, Gernany, Switzerland and the UniEed Kingdom) which are able to
use for that purpose either quantltative neasures in order to insulate
the Euronarket for their currency froD the donestlc one, or the interest
rate as a global instrunent of monetary policy. The results of the mode1,
which exhibit a high interest rate elasticity for Eurocredit, sith the
usual caveats about econometric work, 2/ have pointed ouE that stlch a
policy could be very effective.
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Since such domestic measures might have reslrictive consequences for
international Lrade, a more radical and less politically feasible solution
to this problem rnight be the creation of an internaEional institution ,hich
would have the task of resulatina lnternational liquidity' The resources
1/ c.v. ucKenzie. ( 1981) .
Z/ rn coutiere ( 1975) , the inEerest race elasEicity
domestic demand for credit is -.053 uhich is equivalent
-5,0, after allowing for differences in specifications.
for Ehe l'lench
here roughly to
-33-
needed to iniliate thls international Central BanL (ICB) coutd be set up
by a transfer of part of the forelgn reserves of the partlclpating coun-
trles, in favor of the nes lnstitution. ln counterpart, the ICB vould
issue certlficates of deposit denominated in an International Currency Unit(ICU) bearing inlttally a value and a return equlvalent to the veiAhted
average of the currencies compounding its assets, thus avoidlng to start
wlth a posslble exchange position.
During a transltory period, the ICB would ensure the refinaocing in
Iast resort of the Eurobanks in the present Eurocurrencles and foster the
growth of loans denominated in ICU. The DoDentrD of the substitlrtion
betrdeen the Eurocurrencles and thls international ,noney vould be enhanced
to the extent that the goverrurents would encourage thetr flrrs to invoice
rheir international rrade in lCU.
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